Purpose: To evaluate associations between geographic, structural, and service-provision attributes of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) and the ACOs' quality performance.
and led by physician groups achieved better financial outcomes. Specifically, several studies have found that ACOs participating in the program for a longer time were more likely to earn shared savings 8, 9 and on average generated greater savings per beneficiary. 10 Financial benchmarks were positively associated with saving rates (savings as percentages of benchmarks), but they only accounted for a small percentage of variation, and ACOs with smaller panels of attributed beneficiaries had a higher average saving rate than ACOs with larger beneficiary panels. 11 Early evidence also suggested that ACOs led by physician groups were more likely to achieve shared savings. 5, 9 Based on a national survey of ACOs, researchers found that prior experience with risk-bearing contracts was positively associated with saving rates or receiving shared savings. However, organizational attributes and strategies such as physician leadership, physician representation on the governing board, active programs for reducing hospital readmissions, and financial incentives to individual physicians were not associated with ACOs' financial performance. 12 To achieve long-term success, it is imperative to understand ACO attributes associated with high quality performance. Yet, to date, only a few studies have explored factors associated with MSSP ACOs' quality performance. Research has shown that ACOs serving higher proportions of minorities had poorer performance on 25 of the 36 individual or composite quality measures during their first performance year. 6 Several qualitative studies dived into ACO-level factors and strategies that might contribute to high performance on cost savings and quality. For example, in a comparison of selected high-versus low-performing ACOs, researchers found that collaboration with local hospitals, prior experience with providing cost-effective care, physician leadership focusing on improving performance, sophisticated use of information systems, effective feedback to physicians, and embedded care coordinators were important factors that distinguished high-performing MSSP ACOs from their counterparts. 4 Another study found that MSSP ACOs had largely focused on transforming primary care as a means to improve care and reduce costs using such strategies as expanding primary care access, pursuing medical home certification, reducing avoidable emergency department use, and strengthening care management services. Few ACOs focused efforts on inpatient, specialty, and posthospitalization care during their early years of program participation. 13 Although prior research offers important insights on program characteristics associated with ACO success, most analyses have focused on financial performance and examined whether MSSP ACOs varying on a single characteristic performed differently. No research has systematically examined a diverse set of organizational attributes, including rural presence, that may affect MSSP ACOs' quality performance. Moreover, as quality performance data become available for MSSP ACOs beyond their first performance year (the pay-for-reporting year), new opportunities arise for evaluating how organizational attributes influence changes in ACO quality performance.
To address this gap, we used CMS data and additional data on ACO provider locations and types to simultaneously evaluate associations between geographic, structural, and service-provision attributes of MSSP ACOs and the ACOs' quality performance. We first conducted crosssectional analyses for performance years 2014 and 2015 separately to assess the associations between ACO attributes and quality performance. We then conducted longitudinal analyses to examine the extent to which the observed associations were due to changes occurring within ACOs as compared to variations between ACOs.
Methods

Study Design and Sample
This is a retrospective observational study with a panel design. We conducted cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of MSSP ACOs' quality performance using performance and public-use file data released by CMS 14 and organizational data collected by the Rural Policy Research Institute (RUPRI) Center for Rural Health Policy Analysis 15 and Leavitt Partners. 16 The study sample included 322 ACOs in 2014 and 385 ACOs in 2015 that had successfully reported quality measures. We excluded 11 and 7 ACOs that did not meet the CMS quality reporting or performance standard in 2014 and 2015, respectively. The panel for our longitudinal analysis consisted of 296 ACOs that successfully reported quality measures in both years.
Data
The CMS performance data included 33 Medicare ACO quality measures and an overall quality score. The individual quality measures were reported as performance rates (eg, risk standardized all condition readmission rate), which were scored relative to benchmarks that CMS set for each performance year. CMS used individual scores to calculate domain scores in 4 quality domains: patient/caregiver experience, care coordination/patient safety, preventive health, and at-risk population. CMS then averaged the domain scores to generate the overall quality score. Both domain and overall quality scores were measured as the percentage of points earned
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The publicly available data did not include the overall quality scores for first-year ACOs because these ACOs satisfied the quality standard based on their complete and accurate reporting in their first year of program participation. To conduct a comprehensive evaluation of quality performance, we calculated the domain and overall quality scores for all ACOs based on the program's final rules. 17, 18 For performance year 2014, our calculated overall quality scores perfectly matched the scores reported by CMS for non-first-year ACOs. In performance year 2015, CMS began to reward ACOs for quality improvement by adding reward points to their domain and overall quality scores if they demonstrated significant quality improvement from the previous year. The reward points were important for determining the amount of shared savings that each ACO was eligible to receive and for achieving the program's aims to improve beneficiary outcomes and increase value of care. However, including reward points would augment quality scores and introduce systematic errors to our analysis of quality performance over time. Thus, we excluded the reward points in calculating 2015 quality scores, and our calculated scores closely matched CMS scores within the margin of the maximum possible reward points for non-firstyear ACOs.
We were interested in assessing whether certain organizational attributes such as rural presence, type, size, and program participation as well as services provision such as the use of rural providers, nonphysician providers, and posthospitalization follow-up were associated with ACOs' quality performance. The RUPRI Center for Rural Health Policy Analysis collected data on county locations of all ACO providers. We classified ACO geographic presence categories based on Urban Influence Codes of counties where ACOs had providers listed as program participants (UIC codes 1-2 indicate metropolitan counties and 3-12 indicate nonmetropolitan counties). An ACO was classified as urban if 100% of the counties were metropolitan counties, mostly urban if 67%-99% were metropolitan counties, mixed if 33%-66% were metropolitan counties, or rural if less than 33% were metropolitan counties. Leavitt Partners collected data on ACO provider and sponsor type. Provider type characterized provider organizations participating in an ACO, which was classified as hospital system, physician group, or both (physicianhospital partnership). Sponsor type described a single organization that played the organizing or leading role in an ACO's formation and operation, which was classified as hospital system, physician group, or other.
The CMS public-use file provided information on ACO participants, beneficiaries, and services. We included the following ACO-level measures in our analyses: (1) an indicator of first-year ACO; (2) an indicator of Advance Payment Model participation; (3) beneficiary panel size (1-ACO with fewer than 8,000 attributed beneficiaries; 2-ACO with 8,000 or more and fewer than 12,000 attributed beneficiaries; 3-ACO with 12,000 or more and fewer than 20,000 attributed beneficiaries; 4-ACO with 20,000 or more attributed beneficiaries); (4) 3 indicators of rural provider involvement: 1 for critical access hospitals (CAHs), 1 for Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs), and 1 for Rural Health Clinics (RHCs); (5) primary care services provision measured as percentages of primary care services delivered by primary care physicians, specialists, nonphysician providers (clinical nurse specialists, nurse practitioners, or physician assistants), and FQHCs or RHCs; (6) hospitalization rate measured as the number of hospital discharges per 1,000 attributed beneficiaries; and (7) posthospitalization follow-up rate measured as the number of provider visits within 30 days of discharge per 1,000 hospital discharges.
We conducted sensitivity analyses by using different thresholds for measuring categorical variables including panel size, rural provider involvement, and geographic presence to test whether different thresholds led to different analytical results. We found no substantive difference in the results.
Analysis
We first conducted cross-sectional analyses for performance years 2014 and 2015 separately using multiple linear regression where we regressed the overall quality score on geographic, organizational, and serviceprovision measures. We then pooled the data for longitudinal analyses. A variance-components analysis was conducted to estimate the proportion of variation in quality performance that was due to within-ACO changes and the proportion that was due to the between-ACO variation. 19 To understand the associations between our explanatory variables and quality performance over time, we used a hybrid model (ie, a hybrid of the fixed-effects and random-effects) in analyzing the panel data. [20] [21] [22] Because ACOs were observed repeatedly, the ACO-level mean of a time-varying variable captured the between-ACO variation, and the deviation of each observation from the ACO-level mean captured the within-ACO variation. Both types of measures were included in the model along with time-constant variables. A random ACO-level intercept was included to ensure that the standard errors reflected the dependence among the multiple observations for each ACO. The hybrid model allowed us to estimate the effects of time-constant variables (eg, geographic presence, provider and sponsor type) while obtaining unbiased estimates of the effects of ACOspecific, time-varying variables (eg, percentages of primary care services delivered by different types of providers, hospitalization rate, posthospitalization followup rate). Moreover, a comparison of within-and between-ACO effects provides an important assessment of the degree to which changes within ACOs as compared to variation across ACOs were responsible for the relationships between time-varying explanatory variables and quality performance. These relations are of great interest to policymakers and ACO leaders because policies and practical strategies can be developed based on such knowledge for improving ACO quality performance.
Results
ACO Attributes and Performance Changes
A large majority of MSSP ACOs served exclusively or mostly urban areas. Only 4% of ACOs in 2014 and 5% of ACOs in 2015 served areas with a high proportion of rural counties (Table 1) . Physician group was the most common organizational type for sponsoring and participating in ACOs. ACOs were evenly distributed across different panel-size categories based on our thresholds. CAHs, FQHCs, and RHCs were involved in 8%, 17%, and 19% of ACOs, respectively, in 2014, but their involvement was slightly expanded in 2015 to 13%, 19%, and 22%, respectively. Together, primary care physicians and specialists delivered a large majority of primary care services to ACO beneficiaries. The average rates of hospitalization for beneficiaries attributed to ACOs was 340 per 1,000 beneficiaries in 2014 and 331 in 2015, which were higher than those for the general Medicare population at 280 per 1,000 enrollees for the same period. 23 Posthospitalization follow-up was highly utilized for ACO beneficiaries at a rate of 780 per 1,000 discharges.
The average overall quality score for MSSP ACOs was 84.97 in 2014 and 86.36 in 2015. CMS reported that ACOs which successfully reported quality measures in both 2014 and 2015 improved on 84% of the stable measures and that over 91% of ACOs increased their overall quality score through quality-improvement reward points in 2015. 7 A closer examination of the quality performance without the reward points shows a mixed picture. Among 296 ACOs that successfully reported in both years, 197 or 67% had improved the overall quality score without reward points and 56 ACOs substantially improved their scores by 5 or more points. Meanwhile, 99 or 33% of ACOs experienced some decline in their overall quality scores without reward points, but substantial quality decline was rare and occurred in only 18 ACOs. In both years, significant quality performance variations existed among ACOs. The overall quality score ranged between 57.5 and 95.4 in 2014 and between 57.0 and 97.6 in 2015. The variance-components analysis revealed that both between-ACO differences and within-ACO changes were important sources of performance variation: 61.5% of the variance in quality performance was due to differences across ACOs and 38.5% was due to changes within ACOs.
Associations Between ACO Attributes and Quality Performance
The cross-sectional analyses revealed relationships between the explanatory variables and quality performance in 2 performance years ( Table 2) . Geographic presence was not significantly associated with quality performance in 2014. In 2015, ACOs serving exclusively urban counties performed significantly better than ACOs serving mostly urban or mixed counties. They also performed better than ACOs serving rural counties, but the difference was not statistically significant due to a large variation in rural ACOs' performance. ACOs sponsored by physician groups and other organizations performed worse than ACOs sponsored by hospital systems on quality, and the differences were statistically significant in 2014 but insignificant in 2015. ACOs with larger beneficiary panels, especially those with more than 12,000 attributed beneficiaries, performed better on quality than ACOs with fewer than 8,000 attributed beneficiaries. Advance Payment Model participation and postacute follow-up rate were positively, and first-year status and hospitalization rate were negatively associated with quality performance in both years. Percentages of primary care services delivered by nonphysician providers and FQHCs/RHCs were positively associated with quality performance, but such relationships were statistically significant in only one of the performance years. Other factors were not significantly associated with quality performance. The adjusted R 2 was 0.35 for the 2014 model and 0.27 for the 2015 model.
Results from the hybrid model revealed additional information about the sources of covariance that were responsible for the observed relationships in the crosssectional analyses (Table 3) . Among time-constant variables, geographic presence and provider type had no significant effect on quality performance. Sponsor type and panel size were significantly associated with quality performance. Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of ACO geographic presence. After adjusting for other organizational factors, rural ACOs' average quality score was comparable to that of ACOs serving other geographic categories. Figure 2 shows the marginal effect of ACO sponsor type. Compared to ACOs sponsored by hospital systems, ACOs sponsored by physician groups and other organizations had poorer quality performance. The Among time-varying variables, the between-ACO differences were responsible for most of the observed effects. Across different ACOs, having more than 1 year of program experience was associated with a 3.17-point increase in the overall quality score. The Advance Payment Model participation increased the overall quality score by 2.49 points. A 1% increase in the share of primary care services delivered by FQHCs/RHCs increased the overall quality score by 0.07 points. An increase of 1 discharge per 1,000 beneficiaries was associated with a 0.03-point decrease in the overall quality score. An increase of 1 provider visit per 1,000 discharges was associated with a 0.02-point increase in the overall quality score. hospitalization rate, or posthospitalization follow-up rate did not significantly affect quality performance. Within-ACO differences in RHC involvement and nonphysician providers' provision of care significantly affect quality performance. For a given ACO, changing from noninvolvement to involvement of RHCs increased the overall quality score by 5.6 points. A 1% difference in the share of primary care services delivered by nonphysician providers was associated with a 0.43-point decrease in the overall quality score within the same ACO and a 0.18-point increase if such difference existed between ACOs. The opposite signs for within-and between-effects of this variable suggest that there may be unobserved heterogeneity between ACOs with higher versus lower percentages of primary care delivered by nonphysician providers confounding the observed association between nonphysician providers' provision of primary care and the overall quality score. The R 2 were 0.38, 0.17, and 0.44 for the overall model, within-effect, and between-effect, respectively.
Postestimate and Sensitivity Analyses
We conducted a series of postestimate and sensitivity analyses to validate the results. First, we analyzed the same associations between explanatory and outcome variables using the more efficient random-effects model that pooled differences within and between ACOs, and we compared results with the estimates obtained from a fixed-effects model that drew only on within-ACO differences. A Hausman test (χ 2 = 32.64, P value <.01) rejected the random-effects assumption that there was no correlation between ACO-level errors and explanatory variables. The test supported the use of fixed-effects or hybrid models. Specifically, the test suggested possible unobserved time-constant ACO attributes that might account for the relationships between quality performance and 2 of the covariates: hospitalization and posthospitalization followup rates.
Second, we estimated models using the full sample (N = 707) with an unbalanced panel structure. The results were almost identical to those obtained from the balanced panel. No substantial change in coefficients or significance levels was observed.
Third, we estimated the within-and between-effects of beneficiary panel size by including it as an ordinal and as a continuous variable. The results led to the same conclusion that ACOs with more attributed beneficiaries were more likely to achieve higher overall quality scores and the between-ACO differences were the significant source that contributed to the panel-size effect. Specifically, 1-level difference between ACOs in the panel-size category was associated with a 0.95-point difference (P value < .001) and a difference of 1,000 attributed beneficiaries was associated with a 0.058-point difference (P value < .01) in the overall quality score. A sensitivity analysis using different thresholds for panel-size category suggested that the panel-size effect started to become statistically significant when panel size exceeded 12,000 attributed beneficiaries.
Fourth, we examined the cohort effect by replacing the indicator for first year program participation with an indicator for cohort with different start dates. The results showed that only the first-year ACOs' quality scores were significantly different from those of other cohorts.
Discussion
The Medicare ACO program showed promise in containing healthcare expenditures and improving care quality. 7, 24 Yet, significant performance variations still exist and the program may use the early evidence to reduce performance gaps. In an effort to evaluate ACO quality performance, we incorporated key attributes related to ACO implementation including ACOs' rural presence, structure, and services provision as suggested by policy experts. 25 Our results show that after adjusting for other factors, there was no statistically significant difference between the average quality performance of rural ACOs and that of ACOs in other geographic presence categories. We did observe a larger variation in rural ACOs' quality performance; yet rural ACOs did not differ systematically from other ACOs in their structural attributes such as size and type. Future studies need to explore factors contributing to the larger performance variation among rural ACOs and strategies to close such quality gaps. ACOs sponsored by hospital systems and serving larger attributed beneficiary panels perform better on overall quality than their counterparts. This is different from early evidence that smaller, physician-led ACOs tend to achieve better cost savings. This finding suggests that structural factors associated with ACO quality performance may not align with those associated with financial performance. Physician groups and hospital systems may bring different strengths and capacities to achieving the ACO program's quality and cost-saving goals. While physician groups serving smaller panels may excel in reducing costs by improving primary care and reducing avoidable utilization, larger hospital systems serving larger panels may have invested more substantially in quality initiatives and developed better processes for measuring quality and providing actionable feedback to front-line providers.
Our analysis offers early evidence of program effectiveness for the Advance Payment Model. The model provided upfront and monthly payments to ACOs with limited resources and experiences such as physician-based and rural-based ACOs to invest in necessary infrastructure for delivering high-quality, cost-effective care. Results showed that model participants on average gained overall quality scores that were 2 to 3 points higher than nonparticipants did, after adjusting for other ACO attributes.
ACOs are qualified to retain shared savings if they completely and accurately report quality measures in their first year of program participation. For many of them, the exercise of collecting and reporting accurate quality data was a new experience and protocols tied to specific quality measures might only be in an early stage of implementation, which may have contributed to the negative association between first-year status and the overall quality score.
Involvement of rural providers did not harm ACOs' quality performance. In fact, providing a higher percentage of primary care services through FQHCs and RHCs was positively associated with the overall quality score. Although this finding is not conclusive in our analysis, it suggests that ACOs serving rural communities should consider engaging FQHCs and RHCs in their work, especially in primary-care-focused quality initiatives.
Two service-provision measures, hospitalization and posthospitalization follow-up rates, are strongly associated with quality performance. Although these associations may be confounded by unobserved ACO attributes that simultaneously affect ACOs' patient base, the practice of postacute care, and quality measures, our results suggest that postacute care, especially follow-up visits with primary care providers, may be a feasible strategy to enhance quality outcomes. This is consistent with early evidence that shows by discharging appropriate patients to home rather than facility, follow-up care may help ACOs reduce postacute spending without deterioration in care quality. 26 
Limitations
Our study had several limitations that should be considered when interpreting results. First, we conducted the analyses at the ACO level, and our results only show associations between ACO attributes and quality outcomes at the organizational level. Second, our sample was limited to MSSP ACOs. Organizations voluntarily participating in the Shared Savings Program might differ from other organizations in their ability to manage cost and quality due to selection bias. Thus, our results might not be generalizable to non-ACO providers or other types of ACOs. Third, our data on ACO attributes were limited. Although we considered a number of relevant factors, we did not have information on ACOs' prior experience with pay-forperformance arrangements or their current quality improvement strategies. Future studies of these factors will be necessary to understand what organizational attributes and strategies are effective in producing high quality performance. Finally, as in any observational studies, we cannot draw causal inference. With only 2 years of data, we were also limited in our ability to investigate factors associated with changes in quality performance. As our analysis shows, the observed differences in current quality performance data are largely cross-sectional. Analysis of trends in quality performance will be feasible when future program results become available.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Our analysis of ACO quality performance suggests that several policy and practice approaches may have a positive effect on the quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. First, regulatory and payment policies should address the needs of small and physician-group ACOs for investing resources and gaining economies of scale in their efforts to improve quality. This could be done through demonstration programs for up-front investment such as the Advance Payment Model or the newer ACO Investment Model. Second, because ACOs sponsored by physician groups and hospital systems excelled in different outcomes and may bring different strengths and capacities to achieving the program's goals, ACO leaders may consider strengthening physician-hospital partnerships in order to achieve high performance in both financial and quality outcomes. Third, payment policies could be used to facilitate posthospitalization care coordination that may include follow-up visits to primary care providers soon after discharge. More broadly, ACOs should determine and invest in other posthospitalization interventions that may enhance quality and reduce care variation, readmission, and costs. Finally, regulatory and payment policies may consider encouraging FQHC and RHC participation in ACOs and other value-based care innovations because they serve an important role in delivering care to rural, underserved populations, and our analysis suggests that they make a small positive impact on ACOs' quality performance.
Conclusion
There is no significant difference in average quality performance between rural ACOs and ACOs serving other geographic categories after adjusting for structural and service-provision factors. However, rural ACOs exhibit a larger variation in their quality performance. MSSP ACO quality performance is positively associated with hospitalsystem sponsorship, large beneficiary panel sizes, and high posthospitalization follow-up rates. Structural factors associated with ACO quality performance may not align with those associated with financial performance. Since the goal of MSSP is to form ACOs that deliver highquality, cost-effective care, innovative polices and practical strategies should be developed to help ACOs achieve high performance in both financial and quality outcomes.
